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COMMENTS

The Administrative Muddle In Georgia
In Rogers v. Composite State Board of Medical Examiners,1 the Georgia Supreme Court dismissed as moot a constitutional challenge to the
subpoena power of the State Board of Medical Examiners. Dr. John Rogers, a physician in Columbus, Georgia, was involved in civil litigation with
the board concerning its composition and the appointment of its members.' The final disposition of this suit was in Rogers' favor. While this
litigation was pending, Rogers was served with a subpoena to furnish certain information from his patient files to the Board's investigator. Rogers
was informed that a criminal investigation was being conducted, however,
the investigator refused to respond to Rogers' questions concerning the
nature of the charges against him or the identity of his accusers. Rogers
refused to comply with the subpoena.
Several months later Rogers was notified that the case against him was
"closed". At that time he filed suit challenging the subpoena power of the
Board as unconstitutional and demanding that the Board reveal the identity of his accusers. The Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed his case as
moot stating: "The investigation is closed; he has been entirely
exonerated."'
While devoid of any significant precedential value, this case does raise
an issue which merits serious consideration-the application of procedural due process requirements to hearings by administrative tribunals. In
disposing of Rogers' case the court stated, "Assuming without deciding
that the right of confrontation may apply at some point in the board's
1. 245 Ga. 364, 265 S.E.2d 1 (1980).
2. Rogers v. Medical Ass'n of Ga., 244 Ga. 151, 259 S.E.2d 85 (1979). This case involved
a challenge to the long-standing practice of appointing board members solely on the basis of
recommendations submitted by the Georgia Medical Association. Rogers successfully challenged this procedure, on the basis that a board composed exclusively of Association members could not constitute a fair and impartial tribunal for physicians subject to its decisions
who were not members of the Georgia Medical Association.
3. 245 Ga. at 364, 265 S.E.2d at 1.
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proceedings, that right ended when the investigation was terminated.""
At this point the court stated in a footnote that an accused enjoys the
right to confront his accusers in all criminal prosecutions.5 This raises the
issue of whether or not certain board proceedings should be characterized
as "criminal," thereby requiring the tribunal to comply with procedural
safeguards. The purpose of this comment is to discuss the present state of
both Georgia and Federal law pertaining to procedural safeguards in administrative hearings and to offer a model which would alleviate the present confusion in the Georgia courts.

I. GEORGIA LAW
A.

Characterization

Title 84 of the Georgia Code governs the creation of the administrative
boards in the state of Georgia. Under the office of the Secretary of State
there are forty-three separate licensing boards with membership ranging
from five to twelve members for each board. Because these boards are
self-regulating, members must be selected on the basis of their expertise
and knowledge of the field. Each sub-section of Title 84 establishes procedures to be used to obtain qualified applicants for board membership.
Specific powers are given to these boards in order to facilitate their hearing determinations. These powers include license renewal and revocation,
and the authority to conduct investigations through employees or agents
of the board in order to enforce the provisions of the chapter.
Section 84-105 gives the Joint-Secretary the power to hire investigators
who "shall have all the powers of a police officer of this State. . . ." It is
this investigatory power that triggers the question of whether the examining boards overstep their purely "administrative" functions, and invite
constitutional questions. Because of the problems encountered in defining
the nature of these board proceedings, the implications of utilizing such
investigatory powers becomes of paramount concern.
The Georgia courts' recognition of the nature of investigations conducted by professional licensing and disciplinary boards has taken a
schizophrenic course. This schizophrenia is in the most part a reaction to
the hybrid 7 nature of administrative procedure. In order for judicial re4. Id. (citation omitted).
5. Id. at n.1.
6. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-105 (1979).
7. An administrative agency is a governmental authority other than a court, and other
than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private'parties either through adjudication, rule making, investigation, prosecution, negotiation, setting, or informal action. The
administrative process is often compared or contrasted with the judicial process, the executive process, and the legislative process. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 1 (3d ed.
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view of administrative hearings to be consistent, a bottom-line determination as to the nature of the proceedings must be reached. The reluctancy
of the courts to review hearings, combined with the failure of the courts
to take a hard-line stand as to whether they are criminal or civil leaves
the administrative process in a quandry. Thus, any attack upon administrative procedure in Georgia must initially focus on this dichotomy.
State Board of Medical Examiners v. Lewis s and Alexander v. StateO
are both examples of Georgia case law which highlight the dual characterization given to administrative proceedings. The Georgia Supreme Court
in State Board of Medical Examiners v. Lewis unequivocally stated that
"[t]he language of this provision, making it the duty of the board to 'prefer charges against the physician,' and providing for the revocation of his
license 'in the event of conviction' by the jury, distinctly imports a trial in
a criminal case;. .

The court reasoned that the right to practice

. ."1

medicine, once granted by state license, is a valuable right protected
under the constitution and laws of the licensing state, and proceedings
which place that license in jeopardy threaten to penalize or punish a
physician:
The result, it is true, did not subject the defendant to imprisonment in
the chain-gang [but] .

.

. merely in the revocation of his physician's li-

cense and the striking of his name from the record [of physicians] kept
[by] .

.

. the clerk of the superior court. But this itself was a penalty,

and the proceedings are in the nature of criminal proceedings. 1

In Alexander v. State, the court distinctly characterized the administrative proceedings involved as civil. Petitioner asserted that the imposition of a fine imported a proceeding in a criminal case. The court held
that the forfeiture of the bond was not the equivalent of saying that the
proceedings were criminal. The court stated "that the regulation in issue
is a rule of a state administrative body; . . . and without power to hold

any criminal proceedings.""2
Upon close examination, the question still remains as to whether the
Georgia courts have definitively stated that administrative proceedings
are criminal proceedings. This question of whether the administrative
proceedings are to be characterized as bureaucratic or criminal is of great
import, for this fundamental threshold concept determines whether cer1972).
8. 149 Ga. 716, 102 S.E. 24 (1920).
9. 129 Ga. App. 395, 199 S.E.2d 918 (1973).
10. 149 Ga. at 723, 102 S.E. at 24 (1920) (construing 1913 Ga. Laws 101). See also
Hughes v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 158 Ga. 602, 123 S.E. 873 (1924).
11. 149 Ga. at 722-23, 102 S.E. at 27.
12. 129 Ga. App. at 399, 199 S.E.2d at 921.
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tain constitutional safeguards will be afforded the defendant and considered in judicial review.
B. Due Process Requirements and Other ConstitutionalSafeguards
Administrative hearings must comply with due process requirements.
The tenets of due process that govern these hearings have been stated in
Clary v. Mathews." "[T]he hearing granted by an administrative body
must be a full and fair one, before an impartial officer, board, or body free
of bias, hostility, and prejudgment ... ""
Georgia courts have sketchily addressed the application of certain constitutional areas to the administrative process. A survey of three such areas, the fourth, 8 fifth"' and sixth17 amendments, will afford insight into
the courts perception of the application of these due process standards
and highlight the still unresolved question of whether criminal procedure
is recognized as applicable in the administrative arena.
The fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, the
U.S. Supreme Court has concluded, protects against "warrantless intrusions during civil as well as criminal investigations.' 8 The Court has
found the subpoena, such as the one used in administrative investigation
procedures, to be equivalent to a search and seizure.' 9 Thus, to be constitutional, it must be a reasonable exercise of the power.2 0 The most basic
component of a constitutional search in a criminal setting is that it be
preceded by government compliance with a suitable warrant procedure."
An essential element of this constitutional warrant procedure is the participation of a neutral and detached magistrate in the decision-making
process,"' which subsequently leads to the issuance of the subpoena.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Mancusi v. Deforte2 3 has explained its conceptualization of valid warrant procedure. In Mancusi, state investigators
obtained a subpoena duces tecum from the District Attorney calling for a
union to produce certain books and records. The Court found the subpoena procedure used constituted unreasonable search of plaintiff's office.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

224 Ga. 82, 160 S.E.2d 338 (1968).
Id. at 83, 160 S.E.2d at 338.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
U.S. CONST. amend V.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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They reiterated the rule that, absent exigent circumstances'4 which establish justification for a warrantless search, the search of private property
without proper consent is unreasonable unless authorized by a valid warrant. The Court held that the subpoena involved here could not in any
event qualify as a valid search warrant under the fourth amendment, for
it was issued by the District Attorney himself, and thus omitted the indispensable condition that "the inferences from the facts which lead to
the complaint . . . 'be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-

stead of being judged by the officer . .

' ""

The statutory subpoena scheme in Georgia lacks this procedure. Georgia courts, by characterizing the administrative proceedings as quasicriminal, effectively impose no greater burden on the hearings than what
is set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.26
Georgia Code Ann. section 84-916(d), 7 an example of Georgia's statutory scheme, vests the authority to conduct investigations with the state
examining boards. Documents, writings and other materials which purportedly relate to the licentiate's fitness to practice are made accessible to
the boards through the subpoena power of the Joint-Secretary. The important question thus arises as to the propriety of vesting the authority to
issue subpoenas with the Joint-Secretary and the President of the board,
the entity which acts as prosecutor in the administrative proceedings.
Other areas of concern in the administrative process arise under the
fifth amendment, namely, the availability of the entrapment defense to
enjoin the administrative determination, and whether adequate notice
has been afforded the defendant. The court in Schaffer v. State Board of

24.

See

C. WHITEBRREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES

§ 8.01, at 152-53 (1980):
All of the exceptions of the warrant requirement . . . are based on the concept of
exigency. Each of them embodies recurring types of searches and seizures which
involve either imminent danger to the police, the impending destruction or disappearance of possible evidence, or both. In these emergency situations, the Supreme Court has recognized that only protection of privacy afforded by the warrant requirement is outweighed by the needs of effective law enforcement.
25. 392 U.S. at 371. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) in which the
Court stated that a suitable warrant procedure is essential for compliance with the fourth
amendment's standard of reasonableness in an administrative setting.
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-101 to 124 (1975). This rule is defined in Sheppard v. McGowan,
137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976), as "[a]finding of fact, . . . supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the court, and the Judge of the Superior Court does
not have any authority to set aside an award, . . . merely because he disagreed with the
conclusions reached therein." Id. at 410, 224 S.E.2d at 67. In Georgia State Bd. of Dental
Examiners v. Daniels, 137 Ga. App. 706, 224 S.E.2d 820 (1976), the court held that the Civil
Practice Act was inapplicable to an action brought under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.
27. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-916(d) (Supp. 1980).
AND CONCEPTS
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Veterinary Medicine," established that entrapment could be asserted as
a defense in an administrative hearing. The question, at that time, was
one of first impression in Georgia. The court was persuaded primarily by
the California case of Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners29 which
stated:
"Sound public policy" and "good morals" are incompatible with entrapment of an innocent person into the commission of a crime in order to
revoke his professional license as clearly as they are incompatible with
entrapment in order to obtain a criminal conviction ....The public's
concern with the fair administration of justice attaches equally to administrative as to judicial proceedings.30
In Schaffer, the court also held that proper notice must be afforded the

defendant to constitute a fair hearing.31 Georgia Code Ann. section 3A114(a)(2)(D)3 2 provides that notice of a hearing shall include "[a] short
and plain statement of the matters asserted."3 3 Here, the defendant made
a timely request for a more definite statement, which the Board denied
on the grounds that adequate notice had already been provided. The notice consisted of allegations which involved two rabies vaccinations administered to a dog named "Smokey" and heartworm medication to a dog
named "Mopsey". The court concluded that while these statements were
"short", they were far from "plain" and held this limited notice to be
unreasonable.
The fifth amendment prohibition against putting any person in doublejeopardy for life or limb, has been found to apply only where the individual is subjected to criminal process for the same offense. In Alexander v.

State,3 4 appellant was charged with multiple violations of the laws of
Georgia concerning the sale of alcholic beverages. In an administrative
hearing before the commissioner, his license was suspended for forty-five
days. Appellant asserted that the pending state prosecution constituted
double jeopardy. In reviewing this fifth amendment claim the court held
that there was no bar to the sovereign's imposing both civil and criminal
penalties for the same act. The proceedings before the Revenue Commissioner were characterized as civil and remedial; therefore, no possibility of
double jeopardy existed.
The sixth amendment right of the defendant to confront his accusers
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

143 Ga. App. 68, 237 S.E.2d 68, cert. dismissed, 240 Ga. 313, 240 S.E.2d 887 (1977).
9 Cal. 3d 356, 508 P.2d 1121, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973).
Id. at 364, 508 P.2d at 1126, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 478 (citations omitted).
143 Ga. App. 68, 69, 237 S.E.2d 510, 510 (1977).
GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-114(a)(2)(D) (1975).
Id.
129 Ga. App. 395, 199 S.E.2d 918 (1973).
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and to know the nature of the charges applies where the defendant has
been identified as the target of the investigation. In administrative procedure, if it is determined that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a
hearing, the defendant will be afforded full procedural due process, which
includes disclosure of the identity of his accusers. 8 It is the case of the
internally exonerated defendant, one who is vindicated without a hearing
subsequent to a finding of insufficient evidence, that raises a constitutional question.
Provisions are made in the Georgia Code that afford the defendant a
right of action for malicious prosecution. For example, section 84-916(h) 6
provides physicians with a right of action against persons who file against
them in bad faith: "A person shall be immune from civil and criminal
liability for reporting the acts or omissions of a licentiate . . . which violate. . . any. . . provision of law relating to a licentiate's fitness to prac-

tice medicine if such report is made in good faith without fraud or malice. ' 's7 But in the instance where no formal charges are preferred against
the accused, the courts have held that due process, at that stage of the
matter does not require that the accused be informed of the names of his
8
accusers.3
Malicious prosecution, as provided for in the Code, insures that a defendant has redress from charges brought in bad faith. Ironically, this
protection extends only to those situations where the board has
progressed beyond the investigative stages and has gone into the full proceedings.8 Delimiting these safeguards to a fixed stage in the administrative process severely impacts upon section 84-916(h). A charge brought
maliciously will affect the defendant equally, whether it be at the investigative stage or at a latter point in the proceeding.
C. A Hint of Perception in Georgia
The court in Bentley v. Chastain,0 has made perceptive inroads into
review of the administrative process. While the Georgia courts, for the
35. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-917 (1979).
36. GA. CODE ANN. § 84-916(h) (Supp. 1980).
37. Id.
38. Gilmore v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 243 Ga. 415, 254 S.E.2d 365
(1979). No charges were preferred against Dr. Gilmore. The physician claimed the method
of investigation violated his constitutional rights and sought to know the nature of the
charges and access to the letters of complaint. He claimed the Board's failure to reveal the
letters precluded him from filing a defamation action based upon the letters. Thus, all physicians except those internally exonerated are accorded subpoena power sufficient to determine the identity of the accuser.
39. Id.
40. 242 Ga. 348, 249 S.E.2d 38 (1978).
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most part, have exhibited an unwillingness to fully sustain any one characterization of administrative proceedings, this court may offer the key to
the resolution of this dilemma. Here, the court concluded that administrative agencies exercise "neither judicial nor legislative, but administrative, powers . ."
Because the sphere of administrative law is a component unto itself, having the legislation as its life-sustaining force, the
attributes of criminal or civil safeguards were held inapplicable. The
court found guidance in a Maryland decision which isolated the unique
characteristics of the administrative process:
The primary function of administrative agencies is to advance the will
and weal of the people as ordained by their representatives-the Legislature. These agencies are created in order to perform activities which the
Legislature deems desirable and necessary to forward the health, safety,
welfare and morals of the citizens of this State. While these agencies at
times perform some activities which are legislative in nature and thus
have been dubbed as quasi-legislative duties, they in addition take on
judicial coloring in that frequently, within the exercise of their power,
they are called upon to make factual determinations and thus adjudicate,
and it is in that sense that they are also recurrently considered to be
acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. This dual role which administrative
agencies play has long been accepted in this state as being constitutionally permissible.' 2
Unfortunately, the Georgia courts have not accepted Bentley as a definitive characterization, and thus Georgia law has added a third, and not
final, view of the administrative process. Using Bentley as a beacon, the
courts must recognize the unique character of administrative proceedings
and develop a scheme of appropriate procedural safeguards. Georgia has
laid the conceptual foundation; guidance is now needed for the practical
implementation of this new policy. The best source of this guidance is
found in Federal case law.

II.
A.

FEDERAL LAW

Characterizationof Individual Interests

The general tenor of federal decisions involving procedural requirements for administrative hearings is reflected in Schware v. Board of Bar
8 This decision dealt primarily with the requirements for subExaminers."
41.
42.
Corp.,
43.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 350 (quoting Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel
274 Md. 211, 222, 334 A.2d 514, 522 (1975)).
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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stantive due process:4 ' however, it clearly held that "[a] State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a
manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 45 Schware has been consistently interpreted as imposing a requirement for adherence to the requirements of procedural as well as substantive due process. An important
example of the precedential value of Schware is found in Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness." There the Supreme Court, citing
Schware, held that "the requirements of procedural due process must be
met before a State can exclude a person from practicing law.' '
To fully understand the significance of these decisions it is necessary to
evaluate the reasoning which justifies the imposition of procedural due
process requirements upon administrative board proceedings. The critical
factors are the nature of the individual rights and interests at issue and
the possible effect of administrative action upon those rights and interests. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution says
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."" If a right to practice one's selected profession exists, and it can be characterized as either a property or liberty
interest, compliance with the fourteenth amendment appears to be required of any tribunal possessing the power to exclude one from that
profession.
When a property or liberty interest is at stake, the Supreme Court has
rejected any distinction between "rights" and "privileges" for purposes of
the application of fourteenth amendment due process guarantees.' 9 The
theory that the government must afford an individual certain procedural
safeguards when it acts to deprive him of a "right", but is free of any
fourteenth amendment restrictions when it acts to deprive him of a privilege, has been undermined by recent decisions of the Supreme Court. 50 In
Graham v. Richardson,5" the Court held that "this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a govern-

44. In Schware, the Supreme Court held that an individual could not be denied admission to the practice of law in New Mexico as a result of affiliation with the Communist Party
which had been terminated over fifteen years prior to application for admission to the state
bar. Id. at 246.
45. 353 U.S. at 238-39.
46. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
47. Id. at 102.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

49.

See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).

50. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
51. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

mental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "2 The fact
that the State regulates and grants admission to a profession does not
justify its exclusion of an individual from that profession without due
process of law.
In Board of Regents v. Roth,5 3 the Supreme Court discussed the scope
of protected property and liberty interests:
The Court has . . . made clear that the property interests protected by
procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. By the same token, the Court has required due
process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal
constraints imposed by the criminal process.54
In this case, a non-tenured professor at a state university was dismissed
after one year of employment. He was not given an opportunity to be
heard on the issues relevant to the Board of Regents' decision. He
claimed that the failure to afford him a hearing resulted in a denial of due
process. The Court held that no liberty interest was impacted by the
Board's decision because no action was taken which precluded the professor from obtaining employment elsewhere in his chosen profession." The
Court indicated that an opposite result would be reached if the state had
attempted to bar the professor from all employment at other state
universities."
Once an individual has been granted admission to a profession or fulfilled all preliminary requirements, his interest in its practice can no
longer be characterized as a unilateral expectation. When the state establishes criteria for admission to a certain profession, it is certainly a matter
of mutual understanding between the applicant and the state that admission will be granted if the mandated criteria are satisfied. The right of an
individual who has been admitted to a profession to continue its practice
is likewise the subject of mutual understanding between the state and the
individual. In addition, the right is both protected and limited by state
law. A "legitimate right of entitlement" arises from this state law and
mutual understanding between the government entity and the individual.
Roth indicates that the denial of a particular position can be distinguished from the exclusion from one's chosen profession altogether. This
52. Id. at 374.
53. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
54. Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 573.
56. Id. at 573-74. See also Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) (denial of applications to state bar); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951) (blacklisting group members from any government employment); Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)(statute limiting the precentage of aliens).
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distinction is supported by the decision in Grove v. Ohio State Univer7
sity, College of Veterinary Medicine."
In that case the court held that a
denial of the opportunity to participate in a chosen profession impinges
upon an individual's liberty interests." As a result, compliance with the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is mandatory in any proceeding which potentially impacts this interest.
In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of
interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."69 Expanding upon this the Court said, "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly. . . must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."60 Property interests are not created by the Constitution; rather, they arise from
benefits which are created and secured by an independent source such as
state law.6 1 Once these protected benefits have arisen the Constitution
provides procedural safeguards for their protection. The Court in Roth
illustrated such an interest by reference to the right of a tenured college
professor to his position." This indicates that a property interest may
exist in the right to practice one's profession if that right arises and is
secured by state law or mutual understanding.
This has significant implications for professional licensing and disciplinary boards. Once an individual is granted admission to a profession his
right to continue its practice is protected by state law and is certainly the
subject of mutual agreement between himself and the state. For this reason, he must be afforded due process of law before he can be excluded
from the profession. 8
It is established that under certain circumstances the right to practice
one's chosen profession constitutes a liberty or property interest. An administrative board may not interfere with this interest except by due process of law. It is necessary at this juncture, however, to point out that an
administrative board may not be subject to these requirements with respect to all of its activities. In Hannah v. Larche,"I the Supreme Court
held that an administrative board is not required to comply with certain
procedural due process requirements if it is acting solely in an investiga-

57. 424 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
58. Id. at 382.
59. 408 U.S. at 576.
60. Id. at 577.
61. Id. See also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
62. 408 U.S. at 575-76.
63. See Tomanio v. Board of Regents, 603 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980).
64. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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tive capacity." However, in the same decision, the Court stated that
"when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations
which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that
those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process." ' Professional licensing and disciplinary
boards frequently make decisions which affect an individual's right to
practice his chosen profession. Any such procedure by a board must comport with the requirements of procedural due process.
B.

Specific ProceduralSafeguards

The question remains: what specific procedural requirements are mandated by the application of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to administrative board proceedings? It is well established
that an individual subject to board action must be afforded an opportunity for a hearing on the charges against him. 7 Additionally, he must be
given sufficient notice of the nature of the charges against him to afford
him an opportunity to prepare his case." Additionally, in Willner v.
Committee on Characterand Fitness," the Supreme Court stated that
"[w]e have emphasized in recent years that procedural due process often
requires confrontation and cross-examination
of those whose word de70
prives a person of his livelihood.
In Camara v. Municipal Court7 ' and its companion case, See v. City of
Seattle,7 the Supreme Court held that administrative boards are subject
to the fourth amendnent prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure. The cases require investigators or inspectors acting on behalf of
administrative boards to obtain a warrant to search an individuals premises. However, the requirement is a qualified one.7 The Court stated that
"warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused. ....
C. Characterizationof Administrative Proceedings
While the federal courts have provided a broad spectrum of procedural
65. Id. at 443.
66. Id. at 442.
67. See Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Tomanio v.
Board of Regents, 603 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1979); Grove v. Ohio State Univ., College of Veterinary Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
68. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
69. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
70. Id. at 103. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
71. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
72. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
73. 387 U.S. at 540.
74. 387 U.S. at 539.
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safeguards for an individual subject to board action, they have been reluctant to characterize administrative hearings as "criminal" proceedings:
At least one decision does exist labeling disbarment proceedings as quasicriminal.7 5 The Supreme Court in In re RuffaJo7 6 stated that disciplinary
hearings were "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. ' 1 The
Court was led to this conclusion by its belief that "[d]isbarment, designed
to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the
1
lawyer.

'7 8

The circuit courts have not, however, interpreted this language as a definitive characterization of administrative disciplinary hearings. In In re
Daley,7 9 the seventh circuit held that the fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination was not applicable in administrative board proceedings.8 0 The court held that disbarment proceedings "are neither civil
nor criminal in nature but are special proceedings, sui generis, and result
from the inherent power of courts over their officers."8 " Expanding upon
the nature of these proceedings the court stated that:
a clear distinction exists between proceedings whose essence is penal, intended to redress criminal wrongs by imposing sentences of imprisonment, other types of detention or commitment, or fines, and proceedings
whose purpose is remedial, intended to protect the integrity of the courts
and to safeguard the interests of the public by assuring the continued
fitness of attorneys licensed by the jurisdiction to practice law. The former type of proceedings is, in actuality, "criminal" in nature and therefore within the ambit of the Fifth
Amendment safeguards against self82
incrimination; the latter is not.
The court avoided implementation of the quasi-criminal characterization
found in In re Ruffalo by labeling it as dicta." The seventh circuit's refusal to characterize administrative disciplinary proceedings as criminal
was consonant with the holdings of numerous other federal courts."
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CONCLUSION

A consistent characterization of the nature of administrative hearings is
essential to any effective definition of the scope of procedural safeguards
applicable to such proceedings. Georgia case law in this area is marred by
the courts' apparent inability to choose one path and follow it to some
logical and workable conclusion. The schizophrenic course followed by the
Georgia courts makes it impossible for the individual and the members of
the various administrative boards to determine, with any precision, which
procedural safeguards are essential to due process within the context of
an administrative proceeding. Until the Georgia courts effectively define
the nature of administrative proceedings, case law in Georgia will serve as
a source of confusion rather than guidance to the individual subject to
board action, his attorney, and the board members themselves.
In their efforts to extract Georgia law from its present quagmire of inconsistency, the courts would be well advised to focus on the analysis utilized by the federal courts in the administrative area. The beneficial lesson to be garnered from federal case law is that attempts to characterize
administrative proceedings as either criminal or civil are fruitless. When
they are placed into either category, an awkward fit results.
Rather than placing emphasis upon delineating administrative disciplinary hearings as either civil or criminal, the federal courts have analyzed
the nature of the individual interest at stake and provided appropriate
safeguards to protect that interest. Because the consequences of board
action can seriously impact the vital interests of the individual involved,
due process requires the imposition of rather stringent procedural safeguards upon the conduct of certain administrative proceedings. At the
same time, the federal courts have given consideration to the necessity for
preserving an administrative format with board proceedings. This format
allows those individuals with the greatest degree of expertise, generally
members of the regulated profession, to make decisions concerning the
conduct of members of the profession.
The end result is a scheme of procedural safeguards which is unique to
the administrative hearing. This scheme incorporates some but not all of
the safeguards generally associated only with criminal cases.8" This has
allowed the courts to provide the individual engulfed in the administrative process with necessary protections, without imposing the full spectrum of criminal procedural reqirements upon the administrative board,
thereby negating the benefits derived from the administrative format.
This unique scheme of procedural safeguards will not be triggered by
every type of board activity. When the board is functioning solely as an
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investigative body these safeguards will be inapplicable.8 This is because
no significant threat is posed to individual interests. Likewise, when
board activity lacks potential to impact an individual's "property" or
"liberty" interests he will not be afforded these unique protections. For
instance, when board action would entirely exclude an individual from
participation in his chosen profession a significant "liberty" interest is at
stake and the application of the unique procedural scheme is mandated.
Its application is not appropriate when the mere loss of a particular position is threatened. No "liberty" or "property" interest is a stake in that
situation.8"
Through this approach, the federal courts have taken substantive steps
towards recognizing the unique character of the administrative process.
While they have avoided labeling administrative disciplinary proceeding
as either "criminal" or "civil", they have failed to definitively recognize
the actions of the administrative tribunals as a third, unique sphere.
While their decisions indicate a tacit acceptance of such a position, a
clear statement in support of this characterization is necessary. Such a
statement would provide much needed guidance for states such as Georgia, which have not formulated a consistent approach to this area of the
law.
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